Dr Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin
Mac 28, 10
3:11pm
Nota pengarang: Dr Mohd Asri - bekas mufti Perlis - adalah lulusan sarjana mudanya Universiti Jordan dalam bidang bahasa Arab dan syariah, sebelum melanjutkan pengajian di Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) dalam bidang pengajian Islam. Beliau seterusnya mengikuti pengajian di peringkat doktor falsafahnya di Universiti Islam Antarabangsa (UIA) dengan tesisnya berhubung sebab wurud (terbitnya) hadis.
Ada yang menyatakan kepada saya bahawa dia bimbang negara ini menjadi negara mullah (clergy state) yang akan melarang kebebasan bersuara seperti yang saya dan beberapa pendakwah lain alami. Kata mereka, apabila kuasa agama mencengkam, ramai yang akan terhalang haknya seperti apa yang berlaku di Eropah sebelum Revolusi Perancis.
Saya jawab, saya tidak bimbang dengan pengaruh Islam terhadap negara, bahkan itulah harapan saya sebagai Muslim. Islam dibina atas keadilan dan rahmat. Apa yang saya bimbang adalah cengkaman sesetengah kelompok bernama agama yang berfikiran sempit, fanatik atau berkepentingan sehingga meminggirkan prinsip-prinsip keadilan seperti yang berlaku di Afghanistan dan Nigeria. Bukan salah Islam, tapi salah guna kuasa.
Kita hendaklah mengenal pasti kerjasama antara golongan politik dan agama itu sama ada demi kepentingan kuasa atau kepentingan Islam yang berasaskan keadilan dan kerahmatan.
Begini...
Sepanjang sejarah kita lihat bukan sedikit pemimpin yang cuba mendakwa dirinya adalah jelmaan Tuhan, atau dia merupakan Tuhan. Jika tidak pun, ramai pemimpin tanpa mengira jenis agama, bangsa dan negara cuba menguasai upacara agama, atau menguasai orang agama. Mengapakah hal ini berlaku?
Sebenarnya, politik adalah penguasaan terhadap rakyat. Penguasaan yang paling kuat adalah apabila seseorang pemimpin berjaya menguasai kepercayaan, jiwa dan perasaan rakyat. Sehinggalah apabila 'iman rakyat' dikuasai olehnya, dia bererti benar-benar menguasai rakyat. Mengaitkan diri pemimpin dengan 'Tuhan' atau 'pegangan agama' adalah faktor terkuat untuk rakyat taat dan setia tanpa berbelah bahagi terhadap seseorang pemimpin.
Sebab itu, ramai pemimpin tanpa mengira agama akan mengaitkan dirinya dengan agama tertentu apabila dia dapati pengaruhi agama tersebut kuat menguasai rakyatnya. Dakwaan diri sebagai 'tuhan' atau 'jelmaan Tuhan' adalah termasuk dalam usaha menguasai jiwa dan perasaan rakyat atau menguasai 'iman rakyat'.
Begitulah juga penonjolan ciri-ciri agama seperti membawa orang agama menyokong atau berdoa atau berdampingan dengan sesebuah kepimpinan politik itu kadangkala atas tujuan sedemikian. Maka, sikap pemimpin atau raja menonjolkan unsur-unsur agama atau hubungannya dengan ahli-ahli agama mempunyai berbagai andaian; boleh jadi atas kesedaran dan kecintaan serta ikhlas kepada agama atau 'Tuhan', tetapi boleh jadi juga ada tujuan yang membabitkan agenda penguasaan politiknya.
Orang Agama
Rentetan dari itu, kita hendaklah sedar bahawa seseorang yang diberikan kepercayaan oleh orang ramai disebabkan faktor agama, dia sebenarnya telah memiliki sebahagian daripada kuasa penguasaan terhadap orang lain. Ertinya, dia mempunyai sebahagian 'penguasaan politik' atau kuasa yang menyebabkan orang lain hormat, patuh dan menurut arahannya.
Maka jangan hairan jika ada orang agama yang bersaing antara satu sama lain seperti mana orang politik bersaing. Jangan hairan jika ada imam yang 'senior' tidak mahu memberi laluan kepada 'imam junior' di sesebuah masjid yang hanya berada di hulu kampung. Walaupun kadangkala tiada elaun yang tinggi yang dibayar, namun 'pengaruh politik agama' amat besar harganya bagi seseorang yang terbiasa dengan kuasa penguasaan ke atas orang lain. Itu jika di hulu kampung, bagaimana pulak jika membabitkan tempat, atau wilayah yang lebih besar?
Maka janganlah hairan, jika tanpa keikhlasan iman golongan agama juga akan bertarung dan jatuh menjatuh sama seperti orang politik. Bukan kerana perbezaan idea, tetapi kerana 'kemaruk kuasa' seperti mana yang berlaku kepada ramai orang politik yang tidak bersandarkan wahyu. Mereka pun akan menghapuskan apa sahaja yang boleh mengikis penguasaan mereka. Kata Sufyan al-Thauri (meninggal 161H): "Aku tidak melihat kezuhudan itu paling kurang melainkan dalam perkara kepimpinan (kuasa). Engkau akan dapati seseorang yang zuhud dalam makanan, minuman, harta dan pakaian tetapi apabila tiba soal kuasa maka dia akan mempertahan dan bermusuhan kerananya" (al-Zahabi, Siyar A'lam al-Nubala, 7/262).
Justeru itu juga, kita melihat bukan sedikit golongan agama yang cuba mendampingi pemerintah atau raja. Perdampingan mereka itu boleh jadi kerana keikhlasan untuk menerapkan nilai-nilai agama dan keadilan demi kebaikan rakyat, tetapi boleh jadi juga kerana tujuan untuk menguatkan penguasaan mereka terhadap masyarakat dan rakyat.
Perkongsian dan pertarungan kuasa
Sepertimana politik boleh menjadi saluran mendapat kemegahan, sanjungan, kekuasaaan dan harta, demikianlah agama. Maka sepanjang sejarah, bukan sedikit kita melihat dua kelompok ini berpakat untuk menguatkan antara satu sama lain. Tujuannya; sama ada demi mematuhi perintah agama, ataupun demi mengukuhkan cengkaman mereka ke atas orang lain.
Begitulah juga kita melihat kedua kuasa ini; kuasa politik dan kuasa agama kadangkala bersaing dan bertarung antara satu sama lain. Boleh jadi pertarungan itu disebabkan kuasa politik merasakan kuasa agama bersaing pengaruh terhadap rakyat, ataupun kuasa agama merasakan kuasa politik telah berperanan merentasi sempadan yang sepatutnya dikawal oleh pengaruh agama.
Maka kerja sama atau pertarungan antara dua kuasa ini boleh jadi atas asas menegakkan kebenaran dan keadilan di mana kuasa agama cuba mencegah kezaliman kuasa politik seperti para nabi menentang pemerintah yang zalim di zaman mereka.
Ataupun, kuasa politik cuba mencegah kezaliman atas nama agama seperti kebangkitan Eropah menentang kuasa gereja atau Pemerintah Inggeris yang menghapuskan beberapa amalan agama yang zalim di India seperti sati yang membakar hidup-hidup isteri bersama suami yang mati.
Islam Dan Pemerintah
Islam juga menyatakan pemerintah adalah khalifah yang bertanggungjawab terhadap menegakkan agama dan bersiasah dengan panduan agama. Namun, Islam menjadikan keadilan dan kebenaran yang terkandung dalam al-Quran dan al-Sunnah sebagai asas.
Pemerintah tiada kuasa mutlak atau dianggap maksum (infaillible). Pemerintah sentiasa terdedah kepada kritikan dan pembetulan. Ini terbukti dalam teksal-Quran dan al-Sunnah serta amalan Khulafa al-Rasyidin yang menegaskan prinsip ini.
Membetulkan pemerintah apabila salah adalah satu tanggungjawab. Islam tidak menyatakan semua perbuatan pemerintah itu divine atau diredhai Allah. Islam tidak menyatakan taatlah apa sahaja yang disuruh oleh pemerintah. Sebaliknya, Allah menyebut: (maksudnya) "Wahai mereka yang beriman! Taatilah Allah dan taatilah Rasul dan uli al-Amr (pemimpin) dari kalangan kamu. Kemudian jika kamu berselisih pendapat maka kembalilah kepada Allah (al-Quran) dan Rasul (Sunnah), jika kamu benar beriman dengan Allah dan hari akhirat. Yang demikian itu yang paling utama dan paling baik akibatnya" (Surah al-Nisa' 59).
Ertinya, jika berlaku perselisahan, asasnya bukan pendapat pemerintah tetapi kembali kepada prinsip-prinsip yang terkandung dalam al-Quran dan al-Sunnah. Selepas ayat ini, Allah menegaskan tanggungjawab rakyat melantik pemerintah yang berkualiti dan layak, dan tanggungjawab pemerintah yang dilantik melaksanakan keadilan: (maksudnya) "Sesungguhnya Allah menyuruh kamu menyampaikan amanah kepada yang berhak menerimanya dan apabila kamu berhukum dalam kalangan manusia maka hendaklah kamu berhukum dengan adil. Sesungguhnya Allah memberikan pengajaran yang sebaik-baiknya kepadamu. Sesungguhnya Allah adalah Maha mendengar lagi Maha melihat". (Surah al-Nisa: 58).
Terlalu banyak nas-nas yang melarang mentaati pemimpin secara 'membabi buta' (blind imitation). Antaranya, sabda Nabi s.a.w: "Dengar dan taat (kepada pemerintah) adalah kewajipan setiap individu Muslim dalam perkara yang dia suka atau benci selagi dia tidak diperintahkan dalam perkara maksiat. Apabila dia diperintahkan dalam perkara maksiat maka tiada lagi dengar dan taat".
(Riwayat al-Bukhari dan Muslim).
Islam dan ulama
Islam tidak pernah memaksumkan ulama. Seperti mana orang lain, ulama terdedah kepada salah dan silap. Sebab itu adanya istilah ulama al-suk atau ulama jahat yang menggunakan ilmu untuk kepentingan diri sehingga menggadaikan kebenaran. Bahkan al-Quran mensifatkan ulama jahat seperti anjing dalam Surah al-'Araf ayat 75-76.
Ulama dilarang mengampu pemerintah atas kesalahan atau bersekongkol dengan mereka atas kezaliman. Sehingga Nabi s.a.w memberi amaran: "Sesungguhnya selepasku ini akan adanya para pemimpin yang melakukan kezaliman dan pembohongan. Sesiapa masuk kepada mereka lalu membenarkan pembohongan mereka dan menolong kezaliman mereka maka dia bukan dariku dan aku bukan darinya dan dia tidak akan mendatangi telaga (di syurga). Sesiapa yang tidak membenar pembohongan mereka dan tidak menolong kezaliman mereka, maka dia dari kalanganku dan aku dari kalangannya dan dia akan mendatangi telaga (di syurga)". Riwayat Ahmad, al-Nasai dan al-Tirmizi, ia dinilai sahih oleh al-Albani).
Pemerintah dan ulama
Pemerintah dalam Islam tunduk kepada prinsip-prinsip keadilan dan kemaslahatan rakyat. Bukan kepentingan diri ataupun puak tertentu semata sehingga meminggirkan prinsip kepentingan umum. Pemerintah di suruh bersama ulama jujur demi memastikan mereka sentiasa berada atas landasan yang redhai Allah bukan untuk menguatkan cengkaman kuasa kedua kelompok itu. Sabda Nabi s.a.w: "Tidak dilantik seorang khalifah melainkan akan ada baginya dua bitanah (penasihat yang rapat). (Pertama) Bitanah yang menyuruhnya untuk melakukan kebaikan serta menggalakkannya. (Kedua) bitanah yang menyuruhnya untuk melakukan kejahatan serta menggalakkannya. Hanya selamat ialah sesiapa yang diselamatkan Allah". (Riwayat al-Bukhari dan al-Nasai).
Inilah Perbezaannya...
Jika gabungan pemerintah dan golongan agama itu jujur, maka natijahnya akan ditegakkan kebenaran, keadilan dan kerahmatan kepada rakyat. Pemerintah akan tunduk kepada agama dan ulama akan bebas daripada kepentingan lantas rakyat menikmati keadilan. Sebaliknya, jika tujuannya untuk cengkaman kuasa, kita akan mendapati kedudukan kedua golongan bertambah selesa sedangkan rakyat bertambah resah.
Di dunia Islam, ada mufti-mufti yang berjenama besar, tetapi gagal untuk menasihati pemerintah mereka dengan tegas agar jangan bersekongkol dengan Israel yang menzalimi rakyat Palestin. Lihat apa yang Mesir, Jordan dan negara-negara lain lakukan terhadap nasib rakyat Palestin yang terkepung di sempadan mereka. Ketika golongan agamawan makan mewah di meja bersama penguasa, rakyat Palestin di sempadan mati kebuluran!!
Di negara kita juga mesti dilihat keadaan mana yang berlaku. Umpamanya, jika peraturan agama pencetakan atau selainnya dibuat dengan ditegaskan 'tidak boleh mengkritik mufti' atau sultan atau majlis agama, maka itu untuk cengkaman kuasa. Jika dimasukkan 'tidak boleh menghina Allah dan Rasulullah, itu untuk Islam dan kebenaran!!! Setiap pihak terdedahkan kepada kesilapan dan penilaian, sehingga Abu Bakr dan Umar membenarkan diri mereka dikritik, bagaimana ada kelompok yang tidak boleh dikritik!!
Apabila sesebuah buku diharamkan tanpa alasan melainkan 'panel kurang selesa' atau 'panel agama merasa keliru' maka itu ke arah negara primitive dan kepentingan kuasa. Namun jika dilarang dengan asas-asas ilmiah yang dibahas secara ilmu dan adil, maka itu prinsip Islam!!
Jika yoga diharamkan kerana ada unsur bagai menyembah, tetapi dalam masa yang sama 'adat menyembah raja sehingga merangkak' direstui golongan agamawan, maka itu kepentingan! Jika doa dibaca buat pemimpin dan sultan dimasukkan unsur mengampu dipuja sultan dan raja dalam doa sehingga hilang rasa rendah diri di hadapan Allah maka itu kepentingan 'sambungan jawatan'! Demikianlah seterusnya..
Kita tidak takutkan prinsip Islam ditegakkan, kita takut nama agama digunakan untuk cengkaman kuasa dan kerjasama 'pintar dan putar' antara kedua kelompok ini untuk kepentingan masing-masing! Marilah kita nilai dengan teliti apa sebenarnya yang sedang berlaku...
Sunday, March 28, 2010
Monday, February 22, 2010
Malaysia embarrassed by outdated political thuggery
The case is a joke. It exposes the Najib government as desperate and underhanded. It makes Malaysia a subject of international ridicule. While under Mahathir this form of legal manipulation might have been smart autocracy, in today's world it just looks like Malaysia is playing silly buggers with its national future.
By Peter Hartcher, The Sydney Morning Herald
Dumb autocrats use the army, goon squads and guns to repress the opposition. Smart autocrats use the law courts to do it. Indonesia's Soeharto was a dumb autocrat. Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia's Mahathir Mohamad were smart autocrats.
The Lee-Mahathir model keeps the outward facade of a functioning democracy, with elections, a parliament and supposedly independent courts. Behind it, the systems are gutted to guarantee the ruling party remains ruling.
In Singapore, Lee's People's Action Party has been in power for 50 continuous years, the government simply sues opposition politicians for defamation. A tame court hands down ruinous damages, opponents end up in bankruptcy, jail or exile.
When a meddlesome foreigner like the deputy director for Asia of Human Rights Watch, Phil Robertson, said last month that "Singapore is the textbook example of a politically repressive state," the government just shrugged and said: "Singapore is a democratic state with a clean and transparent government."
The army is in its barracks and there are no goon squads smashing through people's front doors at 3am. It's all legit, see? The foreign investors and governments play along. So what if the ruling party holds 98 per cent of the seats in parliament? It has an elected parliament, and surely that's good enough.
Lee quit the prime ministership in 1990 and now holds a personalised cabinet post of Minister Mentor. But his system lives on. His handpicked successors as prime minister, Goh Chok Tong and now Lee's son, Lee Hsien Loong, have been every bit as smart as the old man himself in preserving the appearance of legitimacy.
In Malaysia, Mahathir was never as subtle or as smooth as Lee. But Mahathir was still a smart autocrat who kept control through his puppetry of the judicial system. The pivotal moment was in 1988 when Mahathir complained that the courts were "too independent".
He purged the chief judicial officer, the Lord President, and suspended the five chief justices of the Supreme Court. The court system has never given any further trouble to the Barisan Nasional, or National Front, ever since. Together with its predecessor, the BN has ruled Malaysia continuously for 54 years.
It's infinitely smarter to use legal instruments to purge judges than to use guns against protesters. A judicial massacre makes lousy TV. You won't see one live on CNN. So it remains hidden from international view. Yet it can be every bit as repressive. So when Mahathir faced a power struggle in 1998 with his deputy prime minister and heir apparent, the charismatic Anwar Ibrahim, he naturally turned to the courts to purge his younger rival.
In a blatantly political fix-up, he had Anwar arrested and charged with sodomy, a shocking crime in a predominantly conservative Muslim country. Even today it carries a maximum penalty of 20 years' jail. The police Special Branch concocted evidence and coerced witnesses. Anwar emerged from his police cell to appear in court with a bruised face, inflicted, it was later learnt, when the chief of police beat him.
The verdict was never in question. The courts convicted Anwar of sodomising his aide and speechwriter, Munawar Anees. The former deputy PM spent six years in jail. Munawar, now living in the US, has since said he was coerced into giving evidence against Anwar. "My detention by the Malaysian Special Branch taught me how it feels to be forcibly separated from one's wife and children," Munawar wrote in the Wall Street Journal last month.
"How it feels to be searched and seized, disallowed to make phone calls, handcuffed, blindfolded, stripped naked, endlessly interrogated, humiliated, drugged, deprived of sleep, physically abused. What it's like to be threatened, blackmailed, hectored by police lawyers, brutalised to make a totally false confession."
With Malaysia under tremendous international pressure from Anwar's admirers, including America's Al Gore and Britain's Gordon Brown, and with Mahathir retiring from the prime ministership in 2003, a review court overturned the sodomy sentence. Anwar was released in 2004.
He was allowed to return to politics in 2008 to lead the opposition to the BN. And he committed the crime of doing so with some success. In March 2008, under challenge from Anwar, the BN won a national election, but was shocked to lose its prized majority of two-third of the seats in parliament. The new BN Prime Minister, Najib Razak, reacted exactly as Mahathir had to a challenge from Anwar.
Four months after the ruling party's election setback, Anwar was once again charged with sodomy. Once again, it's a blatant political case. The newspaper The Star called the case "Sodomy II".
Why is Anwar such a threat?
"At the moment," says Carl Thayer, an expert at the University of NSW, "there is no other leader who can hold together the opposition coalition of an Islamic party with a Chinese party, who is capable of being prime minister, and who has experience and international recognition that Anwar has."
The case is a joke. It exposes the Najib government as desperate and underhanded. It makes Malaysia a subject of international ridicule. While under Mahathir this form of legal manipulation might have been smart autocracy, in today's world it just looks like Malaysia is playing silly buggers with its national future.
Peter Hartcher is the Herald's international editor.
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
Colonial rule (1): British played favourites with the various races
History
Written by Cheah Boon Kheng
Wednesday, 10 February 2010 16:59
Introduction by CPI
Written by Cheah Boon Kheng
Wednesday, 10 February 2010 16:59
Introduction by CPI
“But what began to aggravate and worsen ethnic relations in the early 1930s was a series of ‘pro-Malay’ policies, which the British initiated to help Malays cope with the economic depression and to meet the demands of rising Malay nationalism based on treaty obligations.”
This statement extracted from the article below should lead us to ask whether our leaders are repeating history and why they are not learning from the mistakes of history.
During the period of colonial rule in Malaya, the British favoured themselves and other whites first and foremost, and Malays second in their policies.
As ‘protectors’ of the Malays, the British created various policies that were anti-Chinese. Most non-European residents were either workers or poor. Since the various races were in different sectors and not in direct competition with each other, ethnic conflict was kept under the lid.
As the economic depression intensified, the British rulers found it easier to resort to race-based solutions rather than deal with the real causes and issues.
Today, as the global economy and its fluctuations impact on us, will race-based policies again rise to the fore?
The following essay by Dr Cheah Boon Kheng was published in the book Multiethnic Malaysia – Past, Present and Future under the title ‘Race and Ethnic relations in Colonial Malaya during the 1920s and 1930s’. CPI with permission from the author is carrying it here in two parts.
Dr Cheah is visiting professor at the National University of Singapore. He was previously history professor at USM, and has been visiting professor at the Australian National University and ISEAS. He is also author of several books.
_______________________________________________________________________
‘Race and Ethnic relations in Colonial Malaya during the 1920s and 1930s’
By Cheah Boon Kheng
From the end of the First World War to the beginning of the 1929-1932 Depression, British Malaya experienced an “era of internal peace and unbounded prosperity” and “racial relationships were a model of harmony and good feeling for all the world,” observed American political scientist Rupert Emerson, in his book Malaysia, published in 1937.[1]
But the collapse of Malaya’s boom economy and trade followed the crash of the American stock market in 1929. Malaya’s markets for rubber and tin and other products soon wiped off their staggering gains and fell almost to stagnation. Mines and rubber estates slowly came to a standstill. The tide of immigration, which had flowed so strongly into Malaya from China and India to meet the labour demands of economic production, was now reversed.
Social, economic and political turmoil set in inevitably in the swift transition from prosperity to poverty, and began to arouse latent ethnic hostilities and suspicions among the races, which just stopped short of open conflicts and bloodshed.
As Emerson noted:
This paper demonstrates that the politics of race influenced the colonial government’s intervention during the worldwide depression. In trying to favour the economic interests of one group against another, its policies aroused rather than defused racial antagonisms and generated ethnic animosity and ethnic consciousness.
This is a much-discussed topic in Malaysian economic history. What I present here are the major issues that raised ethnic tensions, but which did not lead to open violent conflict and bloodshed. At the end, I offer an assessment of the impact of these issues on Malaysian history.
Race and ethnic relations in colonial Malaya
Emerson repeatedly uses the terms ‘race’ and ‘racial’ to refer to the different communities in British Malaya, as these terms were in vogue then and refer particularly to physical characteristics, specific types or groups of peoples, and the colour of their skins. Ethnicity, however, is sociologically a broader term and encompasses not only physical characteristics but also identities and other aspects such as language, culture, religion and place of origin. We should bear these differences in mind.
In the colonial society of the 1930s, race and the colour of one’s skin determined the status of a person. Caucasians and whites regarded themselves in a position of superiority, and they looked down on Asians and others.
The colour bar was maintained intact in the Malayan Civil Service[3] and used to prohibit Asians and others from entering exclusively “white” areas in racecourses, clubs and even railway carriages.[4] Within the social and economic structures of colonial society in Malaya, British administrators and traders and other Western entrepreneurs were at the top of the social hierarchy. Rich and influential Asians and Malay rulers and aristocratic Malays would fall within a level below them and may even occasionally be allowed to mix with them at social functions.
The British had acquired and opened up the ports of Singapore, Malacca and Penang in the Straits Settlements in the interests of British capital and Western enterprise and later they extended their control into the troubled peninsular Malay states for the purpose of creating political stability and ordered government of a Western type. Under treaty obligations with Malay rulers, British administrators offered them advice and later accepted Malay chiefs into state councils. Later, other Malays were taken into a special Malay administrative service, but they were relegated to junior positions.
The Malays came to play little part in the shaping of their lives, as British officials took all the major decisions. To all appearances, the form and substance of the Malay states was preserved, alongside the Western political system, administrative structure and economic growth. The bulk of the Malay population remained largely as peasant cultivators in the rural areas within the framework of traditional Malay society and behind the walls of British protection. But Malays were treated no differently from other Asian peoples when it came to the matter of social norms.
Cheap immigrant labour was imported from China, India and elsewhere for manual labour and services in jobs, which the Caucasians or whites or even the Malays were reluctant to undertake.
The British adopted an open door policy on immigration, so that large numbers of immigrant labour poured in, initially into the Straits Settlements, and later into the tin mines and rubber estates of the peninsular Malay states. In the Straits Settlements, where the population was predominantly Chinese, the British administrators attempted to accommodate Chinese interests by according them slight representation on the Legislative Council, and later into the lower rungs of the Straits Settlements Administrative Service. They also met their demands for higher education in Singapore by setting up the King Edward VII Medical College and the Raffles College.
Because the peninsular states remained legally ‘Malay states’ in character, the British refused to take into account the tendencies towards permanent settlement of the Chinese and Indians by granting them citizenship or other rights beyond the normal safeguards to life and property for fear of arousing Malay opposition.
The British thereby even avoided integrating the locally born and domiciled Chinese and Indians with the Malays as it viewed racial integration as a troublesome responsibility. The British as ‘protectors’ of the Malays preserved the distinctions between the separate communities based on the criteria of economic functions, ethnic origin and culture.[5]
The dominant British attitudes of superiority and racial hierarchy led it to adopt a policy of favoritism. In awarding government contracts, loans, and lands and in the protection of legal rights, they frequently favoured British and Western business interests over Asians and other non-Westerners.
These attitudes gradually forced the development of a certain level of ethnic consciousness within each of the three major races in Malaya. Ethnic relations in Malaya during this period, while harmonious, need to be viewed within the context of a colonial framework of a segmented, plural society within which these communities maintained a separate, parallel existence, united by the colonial political system, and which met only in the marketplace.[6] Each racial group kept to itself and performed mutually exclusive functions and received appropriate rewards. Most members of the different races were not in economically competitive roles, and therefore not directly in conflict with each other.
Given the constant flow and uneven nature of immigration from different parts of China, India, and Arabia and also from the Malay archipelago, including the Netherlands East Indies, the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians were themselves more culturally diverse and different than united in the early years of the 20th century. But largely owing to British communal policies and the competition for scarce resources, they began to move towards group formations and a common group ethnic identity. These processes were geared to safeguarding and protecting group interests and rights, requiring communities to close ranks and to de-emphasize their sub-racial, linguistic and cultural differences by adopting a common but larger ethnic ‘Malay’, ‘Chinese’ and ‘Indian’ identity.
For instance, the Chinese in Malaya came from different clans, guilds and provinces of China, and spoke different dialects. Except for those with formal education, few could hardly read, write or speak the official Chinese language, Mandarin. Hakka and Hokkien came from Fujian province, Cantonese from Guangdong province, and Shanghainese from Shanghai, but they were not close to one another as each kept to his own clans or guilds, and intermarriage between these sub-groups was even frowned upon. But for the sake of survival in Malaya these immigrant Chinese gradually began to break down their racial and cultural barriers and develop a sentiment of ‘Chineseness’ to unite and build up a larger ethnic ‘Chinese’ identity.
A similar meaning, understanding and development of ‘Malayness’ and ‘Indianness’ also began to occur among the Malays and the Indians.
This is not the place to go into complexities of ethnic identity in great detail. Suffice it to say that ethnicity in colonial Malaya became a primary source of group loyalty and consciousness for most non-European peoples and served as a strong catalyst for competition and conflict. As American sociologist Martin N. Marger notes: “In no society do people receive an equal share of the society’s rewards, and in multiethnic societies, ethnicity serves as an extremely critical determinant of who gets ‘what there is to get’ and in what amounts.” [7]
As the economic depression worsened in Malaya, the British administration realized it had to juggle the economic interests of the respective groups. Exclusive preference to any one group would fuel ethnicity and communalism, but accommodation and integration of everyone would reduce ethnic tensions. But what began to aggravate and worsen ethnic relations in the early 1930s was a series of ‘pro-Malay’ policies, which the British initiated to help Malays cope with the economic depression and to meet the demands of rising Malay nationalism based on treaty obligations.
These policies were not aimed at instigating Chinese hostilities towards Malays as such, or vice versa, but they had this effect. They polarized ethnic identities and intensified ethnic consciousness among the various ethnic communities.
Ethnicity, it has been said, is the mother of nationalism, which is the mother of nationalism which is the desire to build a nation or a ‘nation state’. A nascent Malay nationalism began to emerge before 1941, demanding an exclusive “Malaya for the Malays”. A multi-ethnic “Malayan” nationalism was absent. What existed in Malaya were rival and different strands of nationalist sentiment in each of the ethnic communities with conflicting interests and different viewpoints that prevented the emergence of a united Malayan nationalist movement.
Curbing Immigration: A ‘Pro-Malay’ and ‘Anti-Chinese’ Policy
Due to large-scale unemployment brought about by the economic depression, the first target of British colonial policies was to repatriate surplus labour, especially those unemployed or displaced Chinese and Indian labourers in the rubber estates and tin mines.
The colonial government refused them unemployment benefits, as it did not accept that it had any responsibilities towards their welfare and regarded the immigration of alien labour as being regulated merely by the economic conditions of the country. The ebb and flow of immigration was tied to the fluctuating world prices of rubber and tin, so it held that alien labour should be prepared to bear the brunt of adverse economic conditions.
While thousands of unemployed or displaced workers accepted offers of free repatriation back to their homelands, thousands more on the estates and tin mines accepted wage cuts and even refused offers of free repatriation as they regarded themselves as permanent settlers in Malaya. Those who accepted repatriation had totally been unable to find employment. Estates and other employers were determined to cut operational costs by displacing workers, or by reducing their wages, although Western enterprises had no hesitation in retaining and maintaining the services of European staff without any pay cuts.
The administration, however, aroused ethnic resentment among the Chinese when it introduced several pieces of legislation towards the control of immigration of aliens which were seen to be discriminatory towards them. The Immigration Restriction Ordinance of 1928 was administered for nearly four years and was then replaced by the Aliens Ordinance on 1 April 1933.
The restriction reduced the quotas drastically of aliens allowed to enter Malaya each month. It applied to all aliens, but since the Chinese were the most affected by this measure, it was represented not only in China but also in Malaya as discrimination against the Chinese race.[8] In the immigration debates in the federal legislative council, Tan Cheng Lock, a Malayan Chinese leader, said “the Bill is part and parcel of an anti-Chinese policy, probably with a political objective….”[9]
What Tan had referred to was a provision in the ordinance, which allowed for the banishment of any alien who was considered “undesirable already in the country”. This was seen as a warning to all Chinese, including the local-born Chinese or those who were British subjects to toe the line or be deported, despite the administration explaining it was aimed at communist elements in the trade unions, who were spreading “subversive political ideas” and stirring up anti-British agitation.
The British were for the first time distinguishing aliens from ‘Malayans of all races’. But the local-born Chinese felt forced to make common cause with the aliens, and to close ranks, thereby strengthening Chinese ethnic unity. According to one source, in so doing, they “played directly into the hands of the pro-Malay faction among the British officials”.[10]
But this British policy was also meant to appease the demands of Malay nationalism. Malay rulers had earlier voiced opposition to increased immigration of Chinese and Indians, and they greeted the new legislation with satisfaction. In the 1931 census, the number of Chinese alone was reported to have exceeded that of the Malays and that in all except the four northern unfederated Malay states they had come to outnumber the Malay population.
The issues soon developed along the lines of ‘Malaya for the Malays’ and ‘Malaya for the Malayans’, with the Malay press and many pro-Malay British officials advancing the former argument. Local-born Chinese leaders like Tan Cheng Lock appealed for British protection for Chinese and those local-born who were British subjects.
In 1929, the last year of free immigration, the number of adult Chinese male labourers entering the Straits Settlements was 195,613, but in 1930 the number dropped to 151,693 and in 1931 to 49,723. No restriction, however, was placed on the immigration of women and children.
By 1933, however, when the economy started recovering, the administration realized that repatriation and the quota restrictions had created serious labour shortages for the mines and other industries. Trade unions, some under communist influence, took advantage of the labour shortages to demand wage increases and improvement in working and living conditions.
Protecting Malay lands and Malay rubber smallholders
The impact of the economic depression on the Malay peasantry and the rural population generally was less severe than it was on the immigrant labour force which depended on either rubber or tin exports, as most Malays were able to grow food on their lands and feed themselves.
But a sizeable number of Malays who planted rubber suffered badly, as their incomes fell sharply and widespread indebtedness was incurred. Smallholding land, outside and even inside the Malay reservations, was mortgaged and sold on an increasing scale and to an extent that aroused serious anxieties on the part of both the British and Malays. The total debts incurred by Perak smallholders alone to creditors (mainly Chettiars) in 1930 increased by 48 percent over the previous year.
As British Residents and European members in the Federal Council urged the government to protect Malay smallholders, the British administration finally decided to take “drastic action… not only in the interests of the Malay peasant himself, but also for the sake of the political well-being of the country”.[11]
As a result, in 1931, the government enacted in the Federal Council a Small Holders (Restriction of Sale) Bill that prohibited the sale of land in any smallholding without the consent of the ruler. Two years later a new Malay Reservations Bill was introduced to close the loopholes in the 1913 enactment and to “make dealings in land in Malay reservations as unhealthy as possible”.[12] The main concern of the government was to prevent Malay lands from passing into the hands of non-Malays, especially Chinese and Indians.
The amendments made irrecoverable all money paid by non-Malays for dealings in reservation, and it was estimated some $5 million in debts were secured on reservation land. However, according to one author, the long-term effect of the amendments was to impede Malay economic development by denying them an important source of capital.[13]
On the other hand, the British administration was not averse to putting aside the reservation land policy in favour of British and other Western economic interests. Statistics revealed that the Europeans owned more than 43 per cent of alienated land in the Malay states, the Malays 27 percent and the Chinese and Indians between them only 23 per cent. In the mid-1930s when Western mining companies pressed to be allowed to mine in Malay reserves said to be rich in tin ores, the government gave in despite opposition from the sultans.[14]
Roff, in his study of Malay nationalism, says these measures to protect Malay smallholders led to growing demands among locally-domiciled Chinese for “equal rights and privileges with the Malays, for a greater share in government and administration than they had hitherto enjoyed, and, quite simply for the right to regard Malaya as their home and not simply their halting place”.[15]
Recent British repressive measures such as arrests and banishment against elements of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party of China) had worried the domiciled Chinese, who regarded these British actions as ‘anti-Chinese’.
Social, economic and political turmoil set in inevitably in the swift transition from prosperity to poverty, and began to arouse latent ethnic hostilities and suspicions among the races, which just stopped short of open conflicts and bloodshed.
As Emerson noted:
“When all classes of all races were being warmed by the golden sun of the boom there was no occasion to bicker either among themselves with the ‘heaven-born’; but when the sun was obscured and the chill rains began to fall it became necessary to crowd for space under the limited space.” [2]
This paper demonstrates that the politics of race influenced the colonial government’s intervention during the worldwide depression. In trying to favour the economic interests of one group against another, its policies aroused rather than defused racial antagonisms and generated ethnic animosity and ethnic consciousness.
This is a much-discussed topic in Malaysian economic history. What I present here are the major issues that raised ethnic tensions, but which did not lead to open violent conflict and bloodshed. At the end, I offer an assessment of the impact of these issues on Malaysian history.
Race and ethnic relations in colonial Malaya
Emerson repeatedly uses the terms ‘race’ and ‘racial’ to refer to the different communities in British Malaya, as these terms were in vogue then and refer particularly to physical characteristics, specific types or groups of peoples, and the colour of their skins. Ethnicity, however, is sociologically a broader term and encompasses not only physical characteristics but also identities and other aspects such as language, culture, religion and place of origin. We should bear these differences in mind.
In the colonial society of the 1930s, race and the colour of one’s skin determined the status of a person. Caucasians and whites regarded themselves in a position of superiority, and they looked down on Asians and others.
The colour bar was maintained intact in the Malayan Civil Service[3] and used to prohibit Asians and others from entering exclusively “white” areas in racecourses, clubs and even railway carriages.[4] Within the social and economic structures of colonial society in Malaya, British administrators and traders and other Western entrepreneurs were at the top of the social hierarchy. Rich and influential Asians and Malay rulers and aristocratic Malays would fall within a level below them and may even occasionally be allowed to mix with them at social functions.
The British had acquired and opened up the ports of Singapore, Malacca and Penang in the Straits Settlements in the interests of British capital and Western enterprise and later they extended their control into the troubled peninsular Malay states for the purpose of creating political stability and ordered government of a Western type. Under treaty obligations with Malay rulers, British administrators offered them advice and later accepted Malay chiefs into state councils. Later, other Malays were taken into a special Malay administrative service, but they were relegated to junior positions.
The Malays came to play little part in the shaping of their lives, as British officials took all the major decisions. To all appearances, the form and substance of the Malay states was preserved, alongside the Western political system, administrative structure and economic growth. The bulk of the Malay population remained largely as peasant cultivators in the rural areas within the framework of traditional Malay society and behind the walls of British protection. But Malays were treated no differently from other Asian peoples when it came to the matter of social norms.
Cheap immigrant labour was imported from China, India and elsewhere for manual labour and services in jobs, which the Caucasians or whites or even the Malays were reluctant to undertake.
The British adopted an open door policy on immigration, so that large numbers of immigrant labour poured in, initially into the Straits Settlements, and later into the tin mines and rubber estates of the peninsular Malay states. In the Straits Settlements, where the population was predominantly Chinese, the British administrators attempted to accommodate Chinese interests by according them slight representation on the Legislative Council, and later into the lower rungs of the Straits Settlements Administrative Service. They also met their demands for higher education in Singapore by setting up the King Edward VII Medical College and the Raffles College.
Because the peninsular states remained legally ‘Malay states’ in character, the British refused to take into account the tendencies towards permanent settlement of the Chinese and Indians by granting them citizenship or other rights beyond the normal safeguards to life and property for fear of arousing Malay opposition.
The British thereby even avoided integrating the locally born and domiciled Chinese and Indians with the Malays as it viewed racial integration as a troublesome responsibility. The British as ‘protectors’ of the Malays preserved the distinctions between the separate communities based on the criteria of economic functions, ethnic origin and culture.[5]
The dominant British attitudes of superiority and racial hierarchy led it to adopt a policy of favoritism. In awarding government contracts, loans, and lands and in the protection of legal rights, they frequently favoured British and Western business interests over Asians and other non-Westerners.
These attitudes gradually forced the development of a certain level of ethnic consciousness within each of the three major races in Malaya. Ethnic relations in Malaya during this period, while harmonious, need to be viewed within the context of a colonial framework of a segmented, plural society within which these communities maintained a separate, parallel existence, united by the colonial political system, and which met only in the marketplace.[6] Each racial group kept to itself and performed mutually exclusive functions and received appropriate rewards. Most members of the different races were not in economically competitive roles, and therefore not directly in conflict with each other.Given the constant flow and uneven nature of immigration from different parts of China, India, and Arabia and also from the Malay archipelago, including the Netherlands East Indies, the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians were themselves more culturally diverse and different than united in the early years of the 20th century. But largely owing to British communal policies and the competition for scarce resources, they began to move towards group formations and a common group ethnic identity. These processes were geared to safeguarding and protecting group interests and rights, requiring communities to close ranks and to de-emphasize their sub-racial, linguistic and cultural differences by adopting a common but larger ethnic ‘Malay’, ‘Chinese’ and ‘Indian’ identity.
For instance, the Chinese in Malaya came from different clans, guilds and provinces of China, and spoke different dialects. Except for those with formal education, few could hardly read, write or speak the official Chinese language, Mandarin. Hakka and Hokkien came from Fujian province, Cantonese from Guangdong province, and Shanghainese from Shanghai, but they were not close to one another as each kept to his own clans or guilds, and intermarriage between these sub-groups was even frowned upon. But for the sake of survival in Malaya these immigrant Chinese gradually began to break down their racial and cultural barriers and develop a sentiment of ‘Chineseness’ to unite and build up a larger ethnic ‘Chinese’ identity.
A similar meaning, understanding and development of ‘Malayness’ and ‘Indianness’ also began to occur among the Malays and the Indians.
This is not the place to go into complexities of ethnic identity in great detail. Suffice it to say that ethnicity in colonial Malaya became a primary source of group loyalty and consciousness for most non-European peoples and served as a strong catalyst for competition and conflict. As American sociologist Martin N. Marger notes: “In no society do people receive an equal share of the society’s rewards, and in multiethnic societies, ethnicity serves as an extremely critical determinant of who gets ‘what there is to get’ and in what amounts.” [7]
As the economic depression worsened in Malaya, the British administration realized it had to juggle the economic interests of the respective groups. Exclusive preference to any one group would fuel ethnicity and communalism, but accommodation and integration of everyone would reduce ethnic tensions. But what began to aggravate and worsen ethnic relations in the early 1930s was a series of ‘pro-Malay’ policies, which the British initiated to help Malays cope with the economic depression and to meet the demands of rising Malay nationalism based on treaty obligations.
These policies were not aimed at instigating Chinese hostilities towards Malays as such, or vice versa, but they had this effect. They polarized ethnic identities and intensified ethnic consciousness among the various ethnic communities.
Ethnicity, it has been said, is the mother of nationalism, which is the mother of nationalism which is the desire to build a nation or a ‘nation state’. A nascent Malay nationalism began to emerge before 1941, demanding an exclusive “Malaya for the Malays”. A multi-ethnic “Malayan” nationalism was absent. What existed in Malaya were rival and different strands of nationalist sentiment in each of the ethnic communities with conflicting interests and different viewpoints that prevented the emergence of a united Malayan nationalist movement.
Curbing Immigration: A ‘Pro-Malay’ and ‘Anti-Chinese’ Policy
Due to large-scale unemployment brought about by the economic depression, the first target of British colonial policies was to repatriate surplus labour, especially those unemployed or displaced Chinese and Indian labourers in the rubber estates and tin mines.
The colonial government refused them unemployment benefits, as it did not accept that it had any responsibilities towards their welfare and regarded the immigration of alien labour as being regulated merely by the economic conditions of the country. The ebb and flow of immigration was tied to the fluctuating world prices of rubber and tin, so it held that alien labour should be prepared to bear the brunt of adverse economic conditions.
While thousands of unemployed or displaced workers accepted offers of free repatriation back to their homelands, thousands more on the estates and tin mines accepted wage cuts and even refused offers of free repatriation as they regarded themselves as permanent settlers in Malaya. Those who accepted repatriation had totally been unable to find employment. Estates and other employers were determined to cut operational costs by displacing workers, or by reducing their wages, although Western enterprises had no hesitation in retaining and maintaining the services of European staff without any pay cuts.
The administration, however, aroused ethnic resentment among the Chinese when it introduced several pieces of legislation towards the control of immigration of aliens which were seen to be discriminatory towards them. The Immigration Restriction Ordinance of 1928 was administered for nearly four years and was then replaced by the Aliens Ordinance on 1 April 1933.
The restriction reduced the quotas drastically of aliens allowed to enter Malaya each month. It applied to all aliens, but since the Chinese were the most affected by this measure, it was represented not only in China but also in Malaya as discrimination against the Chinese race.[8] In the immigration debates in the federal legislative council, Tan Cheng Lock, a Malayan Chinese leader, said “the Bill is part and parcel of an anti-Chinese policy, probably with a political objective….”[9]
What Tan had referred to was a provision in the ordinance, which allowed for the banishment of any alien who was considered “undesirable already in the country”. This was seen as a warning to all Chinese, including the local-born Chinese or those who were British subjects to toe the line or be deported, despite the administration explaining it was aimed at communist elements in the trade unions, who were spreading “subversive political ideas” and stirring up anti-British agitation.
The British were for the first time distinguishing aliens from ‘Malayans of all races’. But the local-born Chinese felt forced to make common cause with the aliens, and to close ranks, thereby strengthening Chinese ethnic unity. According to one source, in so doing, they “played directly into the hands of the pro-Malay faction among the British officials”.[10]
But this British policy was also meant to appease the demands of Malay nationalism. Malay rulers had earlier voiced opposition to increased immigration of Chinese and Indians, and they greeted the new legislation with satisfaction. In the 1931 census, the number of Chinese alone was reported to have exceeded that of the Malays and that in all except the four northern unfederated Malay states they had come to outnumber the Malay population.
The issues soon developed along the lines of ‘Malaya for the Malays’ and ‘Malaya for the Malayans’, with the Malay press and many pro-Malay British officials advancing the former argument. Local-born Chinese leaders like Tan Cheng Lock appealed for British protection for Chinese and those local-born who were British subjects.
In 1929, the last year of free immigration, the number of adult Chinese male labourers entering the Straits Settlements was 195,613, but in 1930 the number dropped to 151,693 and in 1931 to 49,723. No restriction, however, was placed on the immigration of women and children.
By 1933, however, when the economy started recovering, the administration realized that repatriation and the quota restrictions had created serious labour shortages for the mines and other industries. Trade unions, some under communist influence, took advantage of the labour shortages to demand wage increases and improvement in working and living conditions.
Protecting Malay lands and Malay rubber smallholders
The impact of the economic depression on the Malay peasantry and the rural population generally was less severe than it was on the immigrant labour force which depended on either rubber or tin exports, as most Malays were able to grow food on their lands and feed themselves.But a sizeable number of Malays who planted rubber suffered badly, as their incomes fell sharply and widespread indebtedness was incurred. Smallholding land, outside and even inside the Malay reservations, was mortgaged and sold on an increasing scale and to an extent that aroused serious anxieties on the part of both the British and Malays. The total debts incurred by Perak smallholders alone to creditors (mainly Chettiars) in 1930 increased by 48 percent over the previous year.
As British Residents and European members in the Federal Council urged the government to protect Malay smallholders, the British administration finally decided to take “drastic action… not only in the interests of the Malay peasant himself, but also for the sake of the political well-being of the country”.[11]
As a result, in 1931, the government enacted in the Federal Council a Small Holders (Restriction of Sale) Bill that prohibited the sale of land in any smallholding without the consent of the ruler. Two years later a new Malay Reservations Bill was introduced to close the loopholes in the 1913 enactment and to “make dealings in land in Malay reservations as unhealthy as possible”.[12] The main concern of the government was to prevent Malay lands from passing into the hands of non-Malays, especially Chinese and Indians.
The amendments made irrecoverable all money paid by non-Malays for dealings in reservation, and it was estimated some $5 million in debts were secured on reservation land. However, according to one author, the long-term effect of the amendments was to impede Malay economic development by denying them an important source of capital.[13]
On the other hand, the British administration was not averse to putting aside the reservation land policy in favour of British and other Western economic interests. Statistics revealed that the Europeans owned more than 43 per cent of alienated land in the Malay states, the Malays 27 percent and the Chinese and Indians between them only 23 per cent. In the mid-1930s when Western mining companies pressed to be allowed to mine in Malay reserves said to be rich in tin ores, the government gave in despite opposition from the sultans.[14]
Roff, in his study of Malay nationalism, says these measures to protect Malay smallholders led to growing demands among locally-domiciled Chinese for “equal rights and privileges with the Malays, for a greater share in government and administration than they had hitherto enjoyed, and, quite simply for the right to regard Malaya as their home and not simply their halting place”.[15]
Recent British repressive measures such as arrests and banishment against elements of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party of China) had worried the domiciled Chinese, who regarded these British actions as ‘anti-Chinese’.
Tuesday, February 9, 2010
Okay, can we move on now?
NO HOLDS BARRED
Fuck 8 March 2008. Fuck the Federal Court. Fuck that one battle we just lost. Fuck the next few battles we are going to lose as well. Let’s go for the ‘Big One’. Let’s prepare for the next general election. And let’s prepare well, not shoddily like the last time.
Raja Petra Kamarudin
There was this little duck that enjoyed paddling in the small pond below the hill. In the middle of the pond was a tiny island. One day it rained and rained. It rained for days and the pond soon started filling up and the tiny island got smaller and smaller. But the duck did not mind the rain because it liked water.
As it swam near the island it heard a small voice. “Help me! I will drown if you do not help me!”
The duck became curious and swam closer to the island and saw that it was a scorpion. “Help me get off this island,” said the scorpion. “If you don’t help me I will drown.”
“How can I help you?” the duck asked.
“You can carry me on your back and take me across to the mainland,” said the scorpion.
“But if I do that you will sting me,” replied the duck.
“No, I will not. If you help me why would I sting you? If I sting you, you will die, and I will drown.”
So the duck allowed the scorpion to crawl onto its back and it paddled over to the mainland. But halfway across the pond the scorpion stung the duck at the back of its neck. As the duck was dying it asked the scorpion, “Why did you sting me? I am dying and now you will also die.”
“It is what I do,” replied the scorpion.
And they both died.
I remember a meeting I had with Umno Youth Leader Khairy Jamaluddin some time ago when I mentioned that I know he is a more modern and liberal Malay who had received his education overseas all his life. He is therefore not a ‘kampong’ Malay like most Umno Youth members. Why, therefore, does he scream about the New Economic Policy and Ketuanan Melayu and whatnot? He should be more global oriented. He is, after all, a man of the world.
“It is what I do,” replied Khairy with a chuckle. And I understood perfectly well what he meant although I felt he was sacrificing his principles in the interest of doing the ‘politically correct’ thing. Khairy has no choice but to play to the gallery. He says and does things expected of an Umno Youth Leader although that may not exactly be him. But it comes with the territory. An Umno Youth Leader has to act like an Umno Youth Leader is expected to act. And Malay rights and privileges is the name of the game in Umno.
Yes, Khairy, like most politicians, would do what the scorpion did. They would do what is within their nature rather than look at the bigger picture. A scorpion’s job is to sting. Umno’s job is to retain power by hook or by crook and at whatever cost to the nation, democracy, justice, fair play and whatnot. The ends justify the means. It is not how you play the game but winning that counts.
Today, the Federal Court made its decision 5-0 in favour of Umno and Barisan Nasional. So, it is now confirmed, Pakatan Rakyat has been ousted from Perak. And that was the court of last resort. That was the last card Pakatan Rakyat played and it lost the game.
So what now?
So now we move on. We lost and there is nothing more we can do about it. Most know how to manage victory. Very few know how to manage defeat. And we were defeated today in the Palace of Justice in Putrajaya. So let us just manage our defeat like gentlemen and move on.
What did we lose today? We just lost the battle. But we are yet to lose the war. And the war will come, one day. And it will not be long before it does. At most it will be another three years. It could even be only 12 months or so from now. So let’s gear up for the ‘Big One’.
What did we win on 8 March 2008? We won five states and 82 Parliament seats. We denied Barisan Nasional its two-thirds majority in Parliament. Then we lost back one state and the Federal Court today confirmed that loss. Soon we may lose another state and maybe ten or so Parliamentarians and Barisan Nasional will gain back its two-thirds majority in Parliament.
So that will be another one or two battles we are going to lose. But we are yet to lose the war. So what do we want to do? Do we want to just retain the territory we won on 8 March 2008 or do we want to win more territory when the ‘Big One’ comes?
Okay, if it makes us feel better, let’s blame the three Perak ‘frogs’ for our loss. Let’s blame the Sultan of Perak. Let’s also blame the corrupted and manipulated judicial system. Let’s blame all and sundry if that makes us feel better. But that is not going to help us win back anything. It is not even going to help us win the ‘Big One’ when it comes over the next year or two.
So they cheated. So what? It is what they do. It is in their nature to lie, cheat, manipulate, threaten, bribe and play unfairly. It is their job. The ends justify the means.
We knew that the playing field is not level. We knew they would move the goalposts halfway through the game. That is how they do things. So what’s the big deal? Why bitch, moan and grumble about it? Is it not in the nature of scorpions to sting those who are trying to help it? Why are we so unhappy about that?
Why were they able to screw us in our arse? Simple, because we took off our pants and bent down. It is in their nature to screw the opposition. Why did we make it easy for them? Why did we take off our pants and bend down?
8 March 2008 is history. There is no future in the past. The future is in the future. What is waiting for us in the future? Do we know? Have we prepared ourselves for it? Are we better equipped and well geared to take on the ‘Big One’ when it finally comes?
Pakatan Rakyat did not think it would do that well on 8 March 2008. When I went round the country giving ceramahs and when I said in my ceramahs that Pakatan Rakyat will win five states and more than 80 seats to deny Barisan Nasional its two-thirds majority in Parliament many laughed. They said I must be smoking something very strong.
You can see the videos of these ceramahs on Youtube where I said all this. But of course Pakatan Rakyat did not believe this. And they did not prepare themselves to win five states and more than 80 seats in Parliament. So they fielded half-baked candidates whom even I would not vote for.
I remember as we toured the country and my wife met the candidates who would be contesting and she exclaimed, “Heavens! Is this the best the opposition can do? Where the fuck did the party find these people. Aiyoh! Please lah! Can’t they find better people?”
That was my wife’s horror when she met the opposition candidates.
“Seriously,” she said. “If this is the quality of our candidates then better we don’t win the elections. I just can’t see the opposition being able to run this country with these types of people. Aiyoh! Better let Barisan Nasional win lah! I shudder to think what will happen to this country if the opposition wins.”
Anyway, we both voted in Subang USJ9 and we voted for the opposition candidates. But we were actually quite relieved when Barisan Nasional won instead of Pakatan Rakyat.
Now, imagine my wife and me who are fully committed to the opposition cause and yet we were glad that Pakatan Rakyat did not get to form the new federal government. What is wrong here?
So can we forget about Perak? It’s gone. Nasi sudah jadi bubur (the rice has turned to porridge). We can’t undo that now. We need to look to the future. We need to prepare ourselves for the ‘Big One’. We need to ensure that while we have lost this battle, and maybe another one or two as we go along, we shall not lose the war.
Let them win these few battles. Never mind they won by foul means rather than fair. We need to focus on winning the great battle ahead of us, the ‘Big One’.
Hey, they may have won this round, even though unfairly. But did we not also help them win? They could not have won without our help. We chose unstable and unsavoury characters as candidates in the 8 March 2008 general election. And, against all odds, they won, much to everyone’s surprise.
I can almost imagine the top leadership of the opposition falling into their chairs in utter shock when the results came in. “Oh shit! Oh no! Fuck! They won! Hell, what we gona do now? Alamak, we have jokers in our government.”
Remember they could not even find a suitable candidate to become the Menteri Besar of Perak? Finally they had to select Nizar from PAS although his party won the least number of seats in the Perak State Assembly.
Yes, that was our problem. We selected court jesters and found that we had to place these court jesters onto the throne. And that scared the shit out of all of us. That was our problem. And these court jesters proved that they are nothing short of court jesters. And now the opposition is beginning to look like a joke.
Well, what do you expect? It is what court jesters do. They are jokers. So they make the opposition look like a joke.
Fuck 8 March 2008. Fuck the Federal Court. Fuck that one battle we just lost. Fuck the next few battles we are going to lose as well. Let’s go for the ‘Big One’. Let’s prepare for the next general election. And let’s prepare well, not shoddily like the last time.
And then let’s fuck Umno and Barisan Nasional good and proper!
Fuck 8 March 2008. Fuck the Federal Court. Fuck that one battle we just lost. Fuck the next few battles we are going to lose as well. Let’s go for the ‘Big One’. Let’s prepare for the next general election. And let’s prepare well, not shoddily like the last time.
Raja Petra Kamarudin
There was this little duck that enjoyed paddling in the small pond below the hill. In the middle of the pond was a tiny island. One day it rained and rained. It rained for days and the pond soon started filling up and the tiny island got smaller and smaller. But the duck did not mind the rain because it liked water.
As it swam near the island it heard a small voice. “Help me! I will drown if you do not help me!”
The duck became curious and swam closer to the island and saw that it was a scorpion. “Help me get off this island,” said the scorpion. “If you don’t help me I will drown.”
“How can I help you?” the duck asked.
“You can carry me on your back and take me across to the mainland,” said the scorpion.
“But if I do that you will sting me,” replied the duck.
“No, I will not. If you help me why would I sting you? If I sting you, you will die, and I will drown.”
So the duck allowed the scorpion to crawl onto its back and it paddled over to the mainland. But halfway across the pond the scorpion stung the duck at the back of its neck. As the duck was dying it asked the scorpion, “Why did you sting me? I am dying and now you will also die.”
“It is what I do,” replied the scorpion.
And they both died.
I remember a meeting I had with Umno Youth Leader Khairy Jamaluddin some time ago when I mentioned that I know he is a more modern and liberal Malay who had received his education overseas all his life. He is therefore not a ‘kampong’ Malay like most Umno Youth members. Why, therefore, does he scream about the New Economic Policy and Ketuanan Melayu and whatnot? He should be more global oriented. He is, after all, a man of the world.
“It is what I do,” replied Khairy with a chuckle. And I understood perfectly well what he meant although I felt he was sacrificing his principles in the interest of doing the ‘politically correct’ thing. Khairy has no choice but to play to the gallery. He says and does things expected of an Umno Youth Leader although that may not exactly be him. But it comes with the territory. An Umno Youth Leader has to act like an Umno Youth Leader is expected to act. And Malay rights and privileges is the name of the game in Umno.
Yes, Khairy, like most politicians, would do what the scorpion did. They would do what is within their nature rather than look at the bigger picture. A scorpion’s job is to sting. Umno’s job is to retain power by hook or by crook and at whatever cost to the nation, democracy, justice, fair play and whatnot. The ends justify the means. It is not how you play the game but winning that counts.
Today, the Federal Court made its decision 5-0 in favour of Umno and Barisan Nasional. So, it is now confirmed, Pakatan Rakyat has been ousted from Perak. And that was the court of last resort. That was the last card Pakatan Rakyat played and it lost the game.
So what now?
So now we move on. We lost and there is nothing more we can do about it. Most know how to manage victory. Very few know how to manage defeat. And we were defeated today in the Palace of Justice in Putrajaya. So let us just manage our defeat like gentlemen and move on.
What did we lose today? We just lost the battle. But we are yet to lose the war. And the war will come, one day. And it will not be long before it does. At most it will be another three years. It could even be only 12 months or so from now. So let’s gear up for the ‘Big One’.
What did we win on 8 March 2008? We won five states and 82 Parliament seats. We denied Barisan Nasional its two-thirds majority in Parliament. Then we lost back one state and the Federal Court today confirmed that loss. Soon we may lose another state and maybe ten or so Parliamentarians and Barisan Nasional will gain back its two-thirds majority in Parliament.
So that will be another one or two battles we are going to lose. But we are yet to lose the war. So what do we want to do? Do we want to just retain the territory we won on 8 March 2008 or do we want to win more territory when the ‘Big One’ comes?
Okay, if it makes us feel better, let’s blame the three Perak ‘frogs’ for our loss. Let’s blame the Sultan of Perak. Let’s also blame the corrupted and manipulated judicial system. Let’s blame all and sundry if that makes us feel better. But that is not going to help us win back anything. It is not even going to help us win the ‘Big One’ when it comes over the next year or two.
So they cheated. So what? It is what they do. It is in their nature to lie, cheat, manipulate, threaten, bribe and play unfairly. It is their job. The ends justify the means.
We knew that the playing field is not level. We knew they would move the goalposts halfway through the game. That is how they do things. So what’s the big deal? Why bitch, moan and grumble about it? Is it not in the nature of scorpions to sting those who are trying to help it? Why are we so unhappy about that?
Why were they able to screw us in our arse? Simple, because we took off our pants and bent down. It is in their nature to screw the opposition. Why did we make it easy for them? Why did we take off our pants and bend down?
8 March 2008 is history. There is no future in the past. The future is in the future. What is waiting for us in the future? Do we know? Have we prepared ourselves for it? Are we better equipped and well geared to take on the ‘Big One’ when it finally comes?
Pakatan Rakyat did not think it would do that well on 8 March 2008. When I went round the country giving ceramahs and when I said in my ceramahs that Pakatan Rakyat will win five states and more than 80 seats to deny Barisan Nasional its two-thirds majority in Parliament many laughed. They said I must be smoking something very strong.
You can see the videos of these ceramahs on Youtube where I said all this. But of course Pakatan Rakyat did not believe this. And they did not prepare themselves to win five states and more than 80 seats in Parliament. So they fielded half-baked candidates whom even I would not vote for.
I remember as we toured the country and my wife met the candidates who would be contesting and she exclaimed, “Heavens! Is this the best the opposition can do? Where the fuck did the party find these people. Aiyoh! Please lah! Can’t they find better people?”
That was my wife’s horror when she met the opposition candidates.
“Seriously,” she said. “If this is the quality of our candidates then better we don’t win the elections. I just can’t see the opposition being able to run this country with these types of people. Aiyoh! Better let Barisan Nasional win lah! I shudder to think what will happen to this country if the opposition wins.”
Anyway, we both voted in Subang USJ9 and we voted for the opposition candidates. But we were actually quite relieved when Barisan Nasional won instead of Pakatan Rakyat.
Now, imagine my wife and me who are fully committed to the opposition cause and yet we were glad that Pakatan Rakyat did not get to form the new federal government. What is wrong here?
So can we forget about Perak? It’s gone. Nasi sudah jadi bubur (the rice has turned to porridge). We can’t undo that now. We need to look to the future. We need to prepare ourselves for the ‘Big One’. We need to ensure that while we have lost this battle, and maybe another one or two as we go along, we shall not lose the war.
Let them win these few battles. Never mind they won by foul means rather than fair. We need to focus on winning the great battle ahead of us, the ‘Big One’.
Hey, they may have won this round, even though unfairly. But did we not also help them win? They could not have won without our help. We chose unstable and unsavoury characters as candidates in the 8 March 2008 general election. And, against all odds, they won, much to everyone’s surprise.
I can almost imagine the top leadership of the opposition falling into their chairs in utter shock when the results came in. “Oh shit! Oh no! Fuck! They won! Hell, what we gona do now? Alamak, we have jokers in our government.”
Remember they could not even find a suitable candidate to become the Menteri Besar of Perak? Finally they had to select Nizar from PAS although his party won the least number of seats in the Perak State Assembly.
Yes, that was our problem. We selected court jesters and found that we had to place these court jesters onto the throne. And that scared the shit out of all of us. That was our problem. And these court jesters proved that they are nothing short of court jesters. And now the opposition is beginning to look like a joke.
Well, what do you expect? It is what court jesters do. They are jokers. So they make the opposition look like a joke.
Fuck 8 March 2008. Fuck the Federal Court. Fuck that one battle we just lost. Fuck the next few battles we are going to lose as well. Let’s go for the ‘Big One’. Let’s prepare for the next general election. And let’s prepare well, not shoddily like the last time.
And then let’s fuck Umno and Barisan Nasional good and proper!
Sunday, February 7, 2010
Perak No 1... British Intervention and Now way to dark ages..
Bernama
Following is a chronology of the events which unfolded during the political crisis in Perak after the 12th general election on March 8, 2008, leading up to the ruling tomorrow of the Federal Court on who will be the rightful menteri besar of Perak — the current Datuk Seri Dr Zambry Abdul Kadir of the Barisan Nasional (BN) or his predecessor Datuk Seri Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin of PAS.
March 17, 2008: Mohammad Nizar, the state assemblyman for Pasir Panjang, is sworn in as the menteri besar of Perak.
Feb 1, 2009: Perak State Assembly Speaker V Sivakumar announces he has received the resignation letters of Behrang assemblyman Jamaluddin Mat Radzi and Changkat Jering assemblyman Mohd Osman Jailu of PKR. Both assemblymen deny they have resigned.
Feb 3, 2009: Election Commission (EC) decides Behrang and Changkat Jering seats are not vacated and as such by-elections are not required for the constituencies.
Feb 4, 2009: Then Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak announces that Perak BN has a simple majority to set up the state government after two PKR assemblymen and one DAP assemblyman (Hee Yit Foong-Jelapang) quit their parties and become independent assemblymen friendly to BN.
Perak BN and Pakatan Rakyat both have 28 seats each in the state assembly while three assemblymen are independents.
Feb 5, 2009: A media statement issued by the office of the Sultan of Perak states that the sultan will not dissolve the state assembly and has asked Mohammad Nizar and the state executive council to resign or their positions will be deemed to have become vacant.
Feb 6, 2009: Zambry is appointed as the 11th menteri besar of Perak, replacing Mohammad Nizar. BN officially takes over the administration of the Perak government.
Feb 13, 2009: Mohammad Nizar initiates legal action, seeking a court declaration that he is still the rightful menteri besar and an injunction prohibiting Zambry from discharging his duties as the menteri besar.
March 6, 2009: High Court Judge Lau Bee Lan refers to the Federal Court for an explanation of constitutional issues in the summons filed by Mohammad Nizar challenging the validity of the appointment of Zambry as the menteri besar of Perak.
March 23, 2009: Federal Court decides that the Mohammad Nizar vs Zambry case be sent back to the High Court.
April 3, 2009: Mohammad Nizar is given the “green light” by the Kuala Lumpur High Court to challenge the validity of appointment of Zambry as the Perak menteri besar following a ruling by Judge Abdul Aziz Abdul Rahim that the application filed by Mohammad Nizar in February was not frivolous or vexatious and that there was a prima facie case to be argued in court.
May 11, 2009: High Court declares Mohammad Nizar as the rightful menteri besar of Perak after finding that he had never vacated his post as he had not lost the confidence of the majority of the state assemblymen.
May 12, 2009: Zambry remains as menteri besar until the Court of Appeal hears his appeal against the High Court decision declaring Mohammad Nizar as the rightful menteri besar following Court of Appeal Judge Datuk Ramly Ali’s decision allowing Zambry’s application to stay the execution of the High Court ruling.
May 22, 2009: The decision of the High Court is dismissed by the Court of Appeal which declares Zambry as the rightful menteri besar in accordance with the constitution.
June 19, 2009: Mohammad Nizar files leave application to Federal Court to challenge Court of Appeal decision.
Nov 5, 2009: Five-man bench of Federal Court adjourns decision to Feb 9, 2010 after hearing submissions.
AnWar iBrahim On Trial Or Malaysian Judiciary ?
That's why the Obama administration and other Western governments interested in stability in Asia should make clear that the imprisonment of Mr. Anwar would be a blatant human rights violation -- and not in Malaysia's interest.
IN THE PAST two years, Malaysia, which has been a one-party state since it gained independence in 1957, has made remarkable strides toward becoming a democracy. That it has done so is mostly due to the efforts and political talent of one man -- Anwar Ibrahim. So the fact that Mr. Anwar went on criminal trial last week should deeply concern the democratic world. The outcome could determine whether one of Asia's most economically successful countries preserves its stability and embraces long-overdue reforms.
IN THE PAST two years, Malaysia, which has been a one-party state since it gained independence in 1957, has made remarkable strides toward becoming a democracy. That it has done so is mostly due to the efforts and political talent of one man -- Anwar Ibrahim. So the fact that Mr. Anwar went on criminal trial last week should deeply concern the democratic world. The outcome could determine whether one of Asia's most economically successful countries preserves its stability and embraces long-overdue reforms.
A former deputy prime minister in the ruling party, Mr. Anwar was deposed and jailed in 1998 by former Malaysian strongman Mahathir Mohamad. A manifestly unfair trial followed in which Mr. Anwar was convicted of homosexual sodomy, which shamefully remains a crime in Malaysia. Six years later, the conviction was overturned by a court, and Mr. Anwar resumed his political career -- this time as an open champion of democracy in Malaysia and other Muslim countries.
Mr. Anwar succeeded in forging a coalition of opposition parties, including his own multiracial People's Justice Party, an Islamic party, and a secular party. He has campaigned against the government's toxic policy of racial discrimination, which funnels economic favors to well-connected members of the ethnic Malay majority. In the past two years, his coalition has pulled off a string of stunning victories in state and parliamentary by-elections; it now controls four of 13 state governments. If led by Mr. Anwar, it would have a fair chance of winning the next national election in 2013.
That's one reason it's suspicious that, three months after the state election victories in 2008, Mr. Anwar was once again accused of sodomy. Another is that his young male accuser was seen with aides of Najib Razak, who is now prime minister; Mr. Anwar says he has evidence that the accuser met with the prime minister and his wife shortly before making his charge. A third is that the case has been transferred from criminal court to a higher court whose judges are closely linked to the ruling party.
If Mr. Anwar is convicted, he could be sentenced to up to 20 years in prison and would be banned from politics for five years. He is 62. The ruling party no doubt hopes a conviction will cause the opposition coalition to crumble. But it could just as easily provoke a backlash against Mr. Najib or street demonstrations that could destabilize the country. That's why the Obama administration and other Western governments interested in stability in Asia should make clear that the imprisonment of Mr. Anwar would be a blatant human rights violation -- and not in Malaysia's interest.
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